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1. Introduction
Trade policy is mainly import protection, whether we look at industrialized or devel-
oping countries. While economists have come up with many reasons to explain departure
from free trade, most of these reasons, such as the optimal tari® argument or strategic
trade policy arguments, cannot explain the occurrence of trade protection across a great
variety of countries and industry structures. The only theoretical branch with a potential
to explain why almost every country tries to in°uence trade °ows in a vast array of dif-
ferent industries is the political economy of trade policy literature. The problem with this
literature, however, is that it usually comes to the conclusion (Rodrik 1995) that export
promotion should be more pronounced than import protection, a result very much at odds
with empirical facts.
It has been argued that the costliness of tax collection compared to tari® collection
(from now on called costly revenue-raising) may explain why import tari®s are more preva-
lent than export subsidies.
1 In this paper, I investigate this possibility in a protection for
sale framework. The protection for sale model (Grossman and Helpman 1994) has by now
become the new paradigm in the political economy of trade policy literature, and it is thus
a natural choice to view the problem of costly revenue-raising in this setting.
The protection for sale model has been tested for the United States and other coun-
tries and has been found to ¯t the data well. Studies for the U.S. (e.g., Goldberg and
Maggi (1999), Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000), and Eicher and Osang (2002) to name
the most in°uential) typically use non-tari® barrier (NTB) coverage ratios as protection
measures, despite the fact that the theoretical protection for sale model was developed for
tari®s. The cited reason for this digression from theory is that tari® levels are set in mul-
tilateral negotiations, whereas the protection for sale model assumes that trade policy can
be set unilaterally by the domestic government.
In order to investigate the importance of costly revenue-raising in this paper, I break
with the tradition of using NTB coverage ratios, and use tari® data instead. The main reason
is, of course, that many NTB measures do not create governmental revenue. Moreover,
it is common knowledge that NTB coverage ratios, by the very manner in which they
1For example, Riezman and Slemrod (1987) document that tari® rates are increasing in proxies of relative
tax collection costs for a cross-section of countries in 1977.COSTLY REVENUE-RAISING 3
are constructed, can only provide very imperfect measures of how strongly protected an
industry is. For example, compare two industries that both only produce one product. For
one product, a technical standard applies which could be considered a trade impediment,
but in practice may have very little in°uence on imports. For the other product, an import
ban prevents the import of this good from abroad. Yet, when we compare trade policy
restrictiveness based on NTB coverage ratios, we ¯nd that both industries are equally
protected, with an NTB coverage ratio of 100%. Hence, we have to question whether using
NTB coverage ratios in lieu of tari®s when testing the protection for sale model yields
reliable results.
Yet, the problem remains that tari®s are set in multilateral negotiations. This prob-
lem may not be as big as it may seem at ¯rst glance, though. Trade liberalization negotia-
tions start from the status quo of unilaterally-set tari®s and then seek to lower tari®s from
this start level. Oftentimes, the goal of negotiations is to achieve a percentage tari® cut
that applies equally to all industries (e.g., the proposed tari® cut in the GATT Kennedy
Round was 50%). If such a tari® cut comes through, the structure of pre-negotiation tari®s
will be preserved. Moreover, governments usually succeed in getting exemptions from tari®
cuts for industries for which trade policy intervention is deemed especially important. This
then further preserves or even deepens existing inter-industry tari® variations.
In this paper, I show that the protection for sale model explains U.S. tari® data
very well once costly revenue-raising is incorporated into the model. I obtain very precise
estimates of how costly it is to raise revenue by means other than a tari®. It is further
demonstrated that if costly revenue-raising is ignored, the protection for sale model performs
poorly when confronted with U.S. tari® data. The conclusion is that costly revenue-raising
can be considered a major determinant of the observed bias toward supporting import-
competing industries.
The paper is organized as follows: in Section 2, it is shown how costly revenue-raising
alters the equilibrium trade policy results of the protection for sale model. In Section 3, it
is tested whether costly revenue-raising can account for part of the observed bias toward
import protection, using data from U.S. manufacturing. Section 4 concludes.4 XENIA MATSCHKE
2. Theoretical Model
2.1. Basic setup. In the following, I augment Grossman and Helpman's (1994) protection
for sale model, from now on called GH model, to allow for costly revenue-raising.
As in the original GH model, I assume a small country with n + 1 industries facing
an exogenous vector of world prices. The country owns ¯xed amounts of industry-speci¯c
capital Ki, where i = 1;:::;n. Labor is supplied inelastically by the country's population.
The population size is ¯xed at L. While labor cannot leave or enter the country, it is
perfectly mobile between all domestic industries i, where i = 0;:::;n. Industries i = 1;:::;n
are the industries of interest; i.e., the industries which may be subject to trade policy. Each
of them produces a single, tradable good using labor and sector-speci¯c capital according
to a linearly homogeneous and weakly concave production function Fi. Industry 0 produces
a numeraire good from labor with a one-to-one technology, F0 = L0. Good 0 is traded
freely; i.e., its trade is never subject to any trade policy intervention. Clearly, the world
market price of good 0, which is normalized to 1, ¯xes the wage rate. Production in the
numeraire industry thus provides a bu®er for the other industries: Any labor set free in
the non-numeraire industries can ¯nd employment in sector 0, and any additional labor
needs in other sectors can be met by withdrawing labor from the numeraire sector without
a®ecting wages.
On the consumption side, it is assumed that all individuals have identical quasilinear
preferences. The utility function for any individual is the sum of his good 0 consumption
and strictly concave and increasing transformations of the consumption of each of the non-
numeraire goods 1 to n.2 Quasilinearity of preferences implies that the indirect utility
function of any individual is additively separable into an income and a price component.
Speci¯cally, indirect utility can be written as the sum of income and consumer surplus Vi
from consumption of good i where i goes from 1 to n.
Costly revenue-raising is modelled as follows: the domestic government raises a cer-
tain revenue amount from a per-capita tax, import tari®s, and export taxes. Raising the
per-capita tax is costly, i.e., in order to have a certain amount X available from the per-
capita tax, the government has to raise an amount Lf(X) which exceeds X. Here, we can
2It is assumed that each individual has enough income to consume all goods; i.e., corner solutions are
excluded.COSTLY REVENUE-RAISING 5
think of the di®erence Lf(X) ¡ X as some additional labor input requirement for raising
the tax which the government formally pays, but whose cost is covered by raising the tax
amount accordingly. In the end, the costliness of taxation reduces the labor input available
in the numeraire sector 0. For simplicity, the function Lf(X) is assumed to be linear in X,
namely Lf(X) = cX, where c > 1. The government uses the tax revenue to ¯nance export
and import subsidies as well as provide a service to the population. Here, this service is
treated as if it were a simple hand-out of available funds, distributed evenly among the
population.
In some of the industries, but not the numeraire industry 0, capital owners are active
lobbyists that solicit trade protection from the domestic government. Each lobby o®ers the
government a schedule that lists its contributions as a function of the domestic price vector
p. The domestic price vector p may di®er from the world price vector p¤ if the domestic
government imposes a vector t of speci¯c import or export tari®s or subsidies. Hence, if p¤
i
denotes the world market price of good i, then the domestic price is pi = p¤
i + ti. Suppose
good i is an import good. Then ti > 0 (ti < 0) means that an import tari® (import subsidy)
is imposed. In contrast, if good i is an export good, then ti > 0 (ti < 0) implies an export
subsidy (export tax). The lobbies' goal is to maximize their members' income. The part
of income that depends on the chosen price vector consists of pro¯ts, consumer surplus,
and per-capita tax. Notice that imposing an export tax or an import tari® reduces the
necessary poll tax amount whose raising is costly. The government maximizes the weighted
sum of total contributions and aggregate welfare by choice of the trade policy vector. Here,
the weight on aggregate welfare is denoted by a. Contributions C receive a weight of 1.
I assume that contributions do not form part of the funds which the government uses for
providing services to the citizens, so contributions cannot be used directly to decrease the
costly poll tax.
The solution to the lobbying game follows the ¯ndings in GH. The equilibrium tari®
vector is described by the following conditions: It maximizes the government's utility func-
tion, and it maximizes the sum of governmental utility and the utility of any lobby. The
number of conditions is thus equal to the number of lobbies plus one. A corollary of this
result, as pointed out by GH, is that the equilibrium tari® can alternatively be calculated
by maximizing the weighted sum of domestic welfare and the welfare of the di®erent active6 XENIA MATSCHKE
lobby groups.3 It is easy to show that the corresponding weights are a for domestic welfare
and 1 for the welfare of each lobby, or put di®erently, the weights are a for the welfare of
population groups not represented by lobbies and 1 + a for the welfare of lobbies.
2.2. Equilibrium trade policy. Before investigating the case with lobbying, it seems
worthwhile to look at the equilibrium trade policy which emerges when the domestic gov-
ernment simply maximizes domestic welfare. Given quasilinear utility, domestic welfare is
the sum of consumer surplus Vj from consuming the non-numeraire goods j = 1;:::;n and
domestic income. Income consists of the value of production pjFj in industries j = 0;:::;n










Here, Mj > 0 denotes imports and Mj < 0 exports of good j. To see that costly revenue-
raising has an impact on domestic welfare, write out the production value in the numeraire
industry 0, noting that this industry produces one unit of output from one unit of labor
and that its price is normalized to 1, and further noting that costly revenue-raising reduces
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The term in brackets is the production value in the numeraire industry, and T stands for
the revenue amount the government would have to raise if no trade taxes (subsidies) were
levied (granted); i.e., T is the amount necessary to provide the public service. Rearranging










where ¦j stands for pro¯ts in industry j. The above expression shows that the costliness
of raising revenue via taxes puts an additional weight c on tari® revenue. Simplifying
and omitting all components that do not depend on ti, the government chooses ti (where
i = 1;:::;n) to maximize
WG = Vi + ¦i + ctiMi:
3The GH model thus provides micro foundations for the political support function approach where the
welfares of di®erent groups in society receive di®ering weights in the governmental objective function.COSTLY REVENUE-RAISING 7







To sign this expression, I make use of the standard assumption M0
i < 0. If revenue-raising
were not costly, then c = 1 and free trade would emerge, the usual result for small countries
that free trade is optimal. However, since income from trade policy can be used to lower
the necessary tax amount, the government will impose an import tari® (tG
i > 0) on import
goods (Mi > 0), whereas for export goods (Mi < 0) an export tax (tG
i < 0) is optimal.
This means that even for the simple case of domestic welfare maximization, introducing
costly revenue-raising induces incentives to favor import-competing industries and to hurt
exporting industries.
To better understand the outcome of the protection for sale lobbying game, it is
reasonable to look at the trade policy measures that lobby groups would set if they could
unilaterally do so. It has been shown elsewhere (Matschke 2004) that the equilibrium trade
policy vector of the protection for sale model can be viewed as a weighted average of the
unilaterally optimal tari®s of the players of the lobbying game. Viewing these tari®s sepa-
rately provides a better understanding of the forces that ¯nally determine the equilibrium
trade policy.
If capital owners of industry k, where k 6= i, could set the trade policy instrument
for sector i, they would do so to maximize4
Wk = µkctiMi + µkVi;












where Di stands for demand of good i. When c = 1, we see that other industries desire an
import subsidy or export tax for industry i depending on whether i is an import-competing
or exporting industry. This changes, however, once the case of costly revenue-raising c > 1
is considered. It is easy to see that (2.2) is negative for Mi < 0; i.e., exporting industries
would be left with an export tax if the other lobbies could decide trade policy for sector i.
4Here and in the following, I leave out all welfare components that do not depend on ti.8 XENIA MATSCHKE
However, due to the additional costs of subsidies, it is no longer clear whether the outcome
would be an import subsidy for import-competing industries.
Turning to the interests of capital owners in industry i itself, note that
Wi = ¦i + µictiMi + µiVi;















If revenue-raising were not costly, capital owners in i would want an import tari® (for
Mi > 0) or export subsidy (for Mi < 0). Costly revenue-raising reinforces the case for an
import tari®, whereas it is no longer clear whether industry i would want an export subsidy
for its own good.
I now address the solution of the lobbying game itself. Denote by £ the percentage
of all lobbies in the population. I begin with the case that industry i lobbies. As was stated
earlier, the equilibrium trade policy instrument t¤
i maximizes a times domestic welfare plus
the sum of all lobby welfares, i.e.
a(Vi + ¦i + ctiMi) + ¦i + cµitiMi + µiVi + (£ ¡ µi)ctiMi + (£ ¡ µi)Vi: (2.4)
















































If c = 1, import-competing lobbies would receive an import tari® and exporting
industries would receive an export subsidy. But for c > 1, import-competing industries
always receive an import tari®, whereas it is not clear whether exporting industries will
end up with an export subsidy. It is also easy to show that the optimal trade policy is
increasing in demand Di if industry size (as measured by output Fi) and the slope of the
import demand curve are held constant. Notice that the derivative with respect to Di of
the ¯rst-order maximization condition for (2.4) is
(a + £)(c ¡ 1) > 0COSTLY REVENUE-RAISING 9
and has the same sign as
dt¤
i
dDi as long as the second-order condition of maximization holds.5
In particular, this means that any potential export subsidy would not match the import
tari® in size for two otherwise equal industries, one import-competing and one exporting.
It remains to analyze the case where capital owners of industry i do not lobby. In
this case, the equilibrium trade policy instrument maximizes
a(Vi + ¦i + ctiMi) + £ctiMi + £Vi: (2.6)
The equilibrium trade policy instrument for sector i when its capital owners do not lobby
















































If c = 1, import-competing lobbies would receive an import subsidy and exporting
industries would receive an export tax. For c > 1, the case for an export tax is reinforced,
but it is no longer clear whether import-competing industries will have to bear an import
subsidy. It is once again easy to show that the optimal trade policy is increasing in demand
Di, holding Fi and M0
i ¯xed; i.e., industries of the same size (as measured by their output
Fi) receive higher t¤
i as demand increases.6 In particular, any export tax put on goods of
an exporting industry will exceed the corresponding import subsidy (if any) for an import-
competing industry of equal size; i.e., import-competing industries will be favored over
exporting industries.
3. Econometrics
To estimate the model and test its predictions, I use data for U.S. manufacturing
industries in 1983 described in Matschke and Sherlund (2005). The tari® rates and political
action committee (PAC) contributions were provided by Kishore Gawande and are described
in Gawande (1995). Data on imports and exports were taken from the NBER trade and
immigration data base, shipments and value-added from the NBER productivity data base
5Notice that with costly revenue-raising, it is no longer clear that
dt¤
i
dFi > 0, holding Di and M
0
i constant;
i.e., bigger industries in terms of output do not necessarily receive more protection.
6Notice that for t
¤
i < 0, an increase in Di implies a smaller export tax or smaller import subsidy.10 XENIA MATSCHKE
by Bartelsman and Gray (1996). Elasticity estimates come from the study by Shiells, Stern,
and Deardor® (1986). Data on instruments
7 were provided by Daniel Tre°er; see Tre°er
(1993) and Matschke and Sherlund (2005). When merging the data from the di®erent
sources, 194 four-digit SIC manufacturing industries are left. Summary statistics for the
key variables are reported in Table 1.
The econometric model follows directly from equations (2.5) and (2.7). Let indicator
variable Ii take on value 1 if industry i capital owners lobby and value 0 otherwise. The
protection equation can then be rewritten in a uni¯ed form as
t¤



























¡ 1] ~ Fi +
1
(a + £)c




where ~ Fi denotes the value of shipments minus exports8 and ~ Di denotes the value of domestic
consumption in industry i. The expression t¤
i ~ M0






i ei ~ Mi, where
¿¤
i is the equilibrium ad valorem tari® rate, ei = ¡
M0
ipi
Mi is the absolute price elasticity of
import demand, and ~ Mi is the value of imports. In the literature, the import demand
elasticity is often included as part of the dependent variable to account for the fact that it
is a generated (i.e. estimated) variable; see Goldberg and Maggi (1999) for a discussion.
I follow a similar procedure here by including ~ M0
i, which is calculated using the estimated
import demand elasticity, on the left-hand side. The estimation equation thus becomes
t¤
i ~ M0
i = ¯1 ~ Fi + ¯2Ii ~ Fi + ¯3 ~ Di + ²i; (3.3)
7The instrumental variables include factor shares (de¯ned as factor revenues divided by production value)
for physical capital, inventories, engineers and scientists, white-collar labor, skilled labor, semiskilled labor,
unskilled labor, cropland, pasture, forest, coal, petroleum, and minerals. Other instruments include seller
concentration, seller number of ¯rms, buyer concentration, buyer number of ¯rms, scale, capital stock,
unionization, geographic concentration, and tenure.


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































The basic GH speci¯cation without costly revenue-raising results when c = 1, so
that ¯3 = 0. Notice that all coe±cient signs can be predicted, and moreover, we know that
¯1 + ¯2 + ¯3 should be positive. All structural parameters are exactly identi¯ed; namely,
c = 1
1¡¯3, £ = ¡
¯1+¯3
¯2 , and a =
1+¯1
¯2 .
I estimate and compare the basic GH speci¯cation with the cost-of-funds speci¯ca-
tion derived in this paper. Several complications arise in estimating these models. First,
components of the explanatory variables are endogenously determined, thereby suggesting
that instrumental variable techniques be used. A second complication arises because certain
components of the explanatory variables are constructed; i.e., based on data, it must be
decided which of the industries are politically organized and lobby for trade policy, which
is always to a certain extent arbitrary. It is therefore necessary to explore the sensitivity of
the results to di®erent variable formulations.
Standard theory suggests that domestic production for the home market is increasing
in a tari® and should therefore be treated as an endogenous explanatory variable in the
econometric model. Moreover, domestic consumption is decreasing in a tari®, and the
political organization variable is most likely also endogenous. Therefore, I use a two-stage
least squares framework where the explanatory variables ~ Fi, Ii ~ Fi, and ~ Di are instrumented
in the ¯rst stage.
In the second-stage regression, the model is estimated without a constant because
theory predicts that there should not be a constant term. Including a constant creates
a problem since the model estimated with t¤
i ~ M0
i as the dependent variable is no longer




i (which is equal to
t¤
i
pi) as the dependent variable. This
then puts into question the validity of the obtained structural parameter estimates. The
omission of a constant term is also in line with the procedure in Goldberg and Maggi (1999)COSTLY REVENUE-RAISING 13
and Eicher and Osang (2002). In any case, in the sensitivity analysis I also report results
where a constant term is included in the second-stage regression.















Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses.
Superscripts ¤¤¤; ¤¤; ¤ indicate signi¯cance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Table 2 reports two-stage least squares estimation results for the cost-of-funds spec-
i¯cation and the simple GH speci¯cation. All explanatory variables were instrumented
for, using essentially the same instruments as Goldberg and Maggi (1999), Gawande and
Bandyopadhyay (2000), and Matschke and Sherlund (2005): a constant, unionization, factor
shares, concentration ratios, scale, capital stock, tenure, capital-labor ratio, and geographic
concentration.9 To infer which industries are organized, I regress political action commit-
tee contributions divided by value-added on a constant and calculated deadweight losses
10
from protection divided by value-added interacted with 2-digit SIC dummy variables. If
9F-statistics for the ¯rst-stage regressions were all signi¯cant at the 1% level. Hence, we do not have to
worry about weak instruments.








2, given, e.g., in Vousden (1990), p. 49, for linear demand and supply to
approximate the deadweight loss.14 XENIA MATSCHKE
the parameter estimate for a 2-digit SIC interaction variable is positive, I assume that all
industries within this 2-digit SIC classi¯cation lobby. This is supported by theory since
in the protection for sale model, contributions of lobbies should be higher the higher the
deadweight loss that results from an industry's lobbying.
As shown in table 2, the results are highly supportive of the cost-of-funds spec-
i¯cation: All reduced-form parameter estimates have the right signs and are statistically
signi¯cant at the 1% level. The point estimates add up to a positive number, which is in line
with ¯1 + ¯2 + ¯3 ¸ 0. The null that ¯3 = 0 is strongly rejected. The structural parameter
estimates look very good as well.11 As with other studies, I ¯nd that the estimate of the
weight on domestic welfare in the governmental welfare function is high: The point estimate
of 112.26 is very close to the estimate reported in Goldberg and Maggi (1999), where NTB
coverage ratios were used to measure trade protection. At 38.75%, the point estimate for
the percentage of the population represented by lobbies £ seems quite reasonable and lies
between the estimates reported in Eicher and Osang (2002) on the low side and Goldberg
and Maggi (1999) and Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000) on the high side. The cost
parameter c is very precisely estimated at 1.04: This result suggests that raising one dollar
of governmental revenue via alternative taxes costs 4 cents more than raising one dollar by
means of a tari®. The 95% con¯dence interval for c stretches from 1.01 to 1.07; i.e., the
results indeed suggest a positive cost of revenue-raising. That the estimate is quite close to
1 is not surprising, either. We would expect the marginal cost estimate of fund-raising to
be substantially larger when looking at developing countries that heavily depend on income
from trade restrictions (Kubota 2005). Yet, the results indicate that even in the U.S., the
cost of raising funds still has a signi¯cant e®ect on trade protection.
Results for the simple GH speci¯cation show that the tari® data do not support the
basic protection for sale model.12 Whereas both coe±cients are signi¯cantly di®erent from 0
at the 5% level, the estimate of ¯1 has the wrong sign. As a consequence, the point estimate
of £ is negative. The results for the simple GH speci¯cation, contrary to the cost-of-funds
11Standard errors for the structural parameters were calculated using the delta method.
12This is contrary to the results with NTB coverage ratio data for the U.S. in 1983 which support the
basic protection for sale model, as shown by Goldberg and Maggi (1999), Gawande and Bandyopadhyay
(2000), Eicher and Osang (2002), and Matschke and Sherlund (2005).COSTLY REVENUE-RAISING 15
speci¯cation, thus do not provide strong support for the protection for sale model when
tari® data are used as protection measure.
As a check on the robustness of the results, I ¯rst consider two alternative ways of
creating the capital lobby indicator variable. In one speci¯cation, I follow the procedure
in Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000). To determine which industries are organized, I
regress political action committee contributions divided by value-added on a constant and
import penetration ratios interacted with 2-digit SIC dummy variables. If the parameter
estimate for a 2-digit SIC interaction variable is positive, I assume that all industries within
this 2-digit SIC classi¯cation lobby. In another speci¯cation, I divide PAC contributions
by value-added and then use a simple cuto® of 0.001: Industries where PAC contributions
divided by value-added exceed this cuto® value are considered to be organized lobbies.
This procedure is somewhat similar to the procedure in Goldberg and Maggi (1999) except
that they use gross contributions to determine the cuto® value. Columns 2 and 3 in Table
3 report the results when the alternative indicator variables are used. These results are
very similar to the original speci¯cation. All parameter estimates have the right signs and
are statistically signi¯cant. Both the point estimates of £ and a are somewhat higher
than the original estimates when the Gawande-Bandyopadhyay-like indicator is used and
somewhat lower when the Goldberg-Maggi-like estimator is used, whereas the cost estimate


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Using all three alternative lobby indicator speci¯cations, I then consider an alterna-
tive protection measure; namely, the tari® levels from the tari® data set assembled by Chris
Magee, which was downloaded from http://www.internationaldata.org. The estimates
obtained with these data (columns 4 to 6 of Table 3) are also very similar to the original
results and provide very strong support for the cost-of-funds speci¯cation. They also show
how robust the cost estimates of revenue-raising are. Compared to the results obtained
when using the Gawande tari® data, the cost estimates increase slightly to 5{6 cents per
dollar.
As a ¯nal robustness test, I consider all three capital indicator speci¯cations, but
now estimate the model with a constant. The results are reported in columns 7 to 9 of Table
3. In two of the three speci¯cations, the estimate of ¯0 is signi¯cantly di®erent from 0. The
estimates of ¯1, ¯2, and ¯3 all have the right signs; however, ¯2 is no longer signi¯cant at
standard signi¯cance levels except for one speci¯cation. Whereas the structural parameter
point estimates are comparable to the ones obtained earlier, almost all estimates for £
and a lose statistical signi¯cance. The estimate of c, however, remains highly statistically
signi¯cant in all speci¯cations, and the point estimates are almost identical to those obtained
in the estimation without a constant. This underlines the importance of accounting for
costly revenue-raising in the estimation.
4. Conclusion
This paper shows how introducing costly revenue-raising (i.e., the marginal cost of
raising additional revenue exceeds unity) into a standard protection for sale model may
explain why, in general, import-competing industries receive more trade policy support
than exporting industries. This cost-of-funds speci¯cation of the protection for sale model,
when tested using 1983 U.S. tari® data, ¯nds strong empirical support, quite in contrast to
the basic Grossman-Helpman model which is not supported by the tari® data. The point
estimate of the additional cost of raising one dollar in taxes as compared to raising one dollar
in tari®s lies between 4 and 5 cents, with the lower boundary of 95% con¯dence intervals
for this cost always exceeding 0. Costly revenue-raising has a signi¯cant e®ect on tari®
levels, all else being equal. The policy implication is that part of the bias toward import
protection can be explained by the fact that import tari®s raise governmental revenue and
as such reduce the need for costly revenue-raising via taxes.18 XENIA MATSCHKE
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